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RELEASE  
DATE: 03-04-2016~~SECRET//NC/CIA-IUO/ORCON/NOFORN//MR~~

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~~(S//NC/CIA-IUO/OC/NF)~~ SUBJ: LACK OF HIGH COMMAND SUPPORT FOR THE FOURTH INFANTRY BRIGADE

Central Intelligence Agency

17 November 1984

(b)(3) NatSecAct

Doc Number: [REDACTED]

SOURCE: [REDACTED]

~~(S//NC/CIA-IUO/OC/NF)~~ DIST: 17 NOVEMBER 1984

COUNTRY: EL SALVADOR

SUBJ: LACK OF HIGH COMMAND SUPPORT FOR THE FOURTH INFANTRY BRIGADE

DOI: JANUARY-NOVEMBER 1984

SOURCE: [REDACTED]

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(b)(3) NatSecAct

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TEXT: 1. TO DATE IN 1984, THE FOURTH INFANTRY BRIGADE IN EL PARAISO, DEPARTMENT OF CHALATENANGO, HAS HAD FOUR EXECUTIVE OFFICERS. THE CURRENT ONE, LIEUTENANT COLONEL MAURICIO ((LOPEZ)) DELGADO, PLANS TO REMAIN WITH THE BRIGADE ONLY UNTIL DECEMBER 1984. THE ADMINISTRATIVE SECTION (S-1) IS HEADED BY A CAPTAIN, THE INTELLIGENCE SECTION (S-2) IS HEADED BY A SUB-LIEUTENANT. THE OPERATIONS SECTION (S-3) IS HEADED BY A MAJOR WHO IS CURRENTLY IN PANAMA WHILE MAJOR OPERATIONS ARE TAKING PLACE IN CHALATENANGO. HIS SECOND-IN-COMMAND IS A SUB-LIEUTENANT. THE LOGISTICS SECTIONS (S-4) IS HEADED BY A CAPTAIN. THE CIVIL AFFAIRS SECTION (S-5) IS VACANT WITH THE S-1 DEVOTING SOME ATTENTION TO IT. [REDACTED] COMMENT: THESE POSITIONS SHOULD BE STAFFED BY MAJORS OR LIEUTENANT COLONELS.) IN OCTOBER THE HIGH COMMAND TRANSFERRED ONE OFFICER OUT OF THE BRIGADE AND TWO MORE IN NOVEMBER. NO REPLACEMENTS HAVE BEEN NAMED FOR THESE OFFICERS.

2. THE HIGH COMMAND PROMISED THE BRIGADE COMMANDER, LIEUTENANT COLONEL SIGIFREDO ((OCHOA)) PEREZ, THAT

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RESPONSIBILITY FOR GUARDING THE BRIDGES AT COLIMA (1403N 8908W) AND HACELHUATE (1403N 8909W) ON THE NORTHERN TRUNK HIGHWAY WOULD PASS FROM HIS BRIGADE TO ANOTHER UNIT. IN OCTOBER 1984, THE TREASURY POLICE ASSUMED THE RESPONSIBILITY BUT, AFTER ONE WEEK, THE RESPONSIBILITY WAS RETURNED TO THE FOURTH BRIGADE.

3. PERSONNEL OF THE BRIGADE VIEW THE LACK OF REPLACEMENT OFFICERS AND THE CONTINUED NEED TO USE A LARGE NUMBER OF THE BRIGADE'S FORCES TO PROTECT FIXED INSTALLATIONS SUCH AS THE BRIDGES RATHER THAN FREEING THE FORCES FOR COMBAT AS INDICATIONS THAT THE HIGH COMMAND IS NOT REALLY INTERESTED IN PROVIDING THE FOURTH BRIGADE WITH THE SUPPORT NEEDED TO EFFECTIVELY COMBAT THE INSURGENT PROBLEM IN CHALATENANGO DEPARTMENT. [REDACTED] COMMENT: ALTHOUGH OCHOA WANTS HIS COMMAND STAFFED WITH EXPERIENCED FIELD GRADE OFFICERS HE IS RELUCTANT TO PRESS THE HIGH COMMAND FOR THEM AT THIS TIME. THE REASON FOR THIS RELUCTANCE IS UNKNOWN.)

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[REDACTED] ALL .  
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